Journal of Moral Theology, Volume 1, Number 2
186 Pages
English

Journal of Moral Theology, Volume 1, Number 2

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186 Pages
English

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Love
Volume 1, Number 2, June 2012
Edited by David Matzko McCarthy and Joshua P. Hochschild
Love: A Thomistic Analysis
Diane Fritz Cates
Movements of Love: A Thomistic Perspective on Eros and Agape
William C. Mattison III
Love and Poverty: Dorothy Day's Twofold Diakonia
Margaret R. Pfeil
What's Love Got to Do With It?
Situating a Theological Virtue in the Practice of Medicine
Brian E. Volck
Adoption and the Goods of Birth
Holly Taylor Coolman
Natural Law and the Language of Love
Charles Pinchas and David Matzko McCarthy
Review Essay: Love and Recent Developments in Moral Theology
Bernard V. Brady

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Voume 1, Number 2June 2012 LOVEEdîted byDavîd M. McCarthyandJoshua P. Hochschîd Love: A omîstîc Anaysîs ................................................................................... 1 Dîana Frîtz Cates Movements of Love: A omîstîc Perspectîve onErosandAgape............................................................................................ 31 Wîîam C. Mattîson III Love and Poverty: Dorothy Day’s TwofodDîakonîa..................................... 61 Margaret R. Pfeî What’s Love Got to Do Wîth It? Sîtuatîng a eoogîca Vîrtue în the Practîce of Medîcîne.............................................................................. 72 Brîan E. Vock Adoptîon and the Goods of Bîrth....................................................................... 96 Hoy Tayor Cooman Natura Law and the Language of Love ........................................................... 116 Chares PînchesandDavîd Matzko McCarthy Revîew Essay: Love and Recent Deveopments în Mora eoogy ............ 148 Bernard V. Brady
EDITOR Davîd M. McCarthy,Mount St. Mary’s UnîversîtyEDITORIAL BOARD Meanîe Barrett,Unîversîty of St. Mary of the Lake/Mundeeîn Semînary Jana M. Bennett,Unîversîty of Dayton Joseph Capîzzî,e Cathoîc Unîversîty of AmerîcaDavîd Coutîer,Mount St. Mary’s UnîversîtyKey Johnson,Unîversîty of Dayton M. erese Lysaught,Marquette Unîversîty Rev. Bryan Massîngae,Marquette Unîversîty  Wîîam C. Mattîson III,e Cathoîc Unîversîty of Amerîca Jeanne Heffernan Schînder,Vîanova Unîversîty Msgr. Stuart W. Swetand,Mount St. Mary’s Unîversîty  Chrîstopher P. Vogt,St. John’s Unîversîty Journa of Mora eoogy îs a peer-revîewed schoary journa focusîng on Cathoîc mora theoogy. It îs concerned wîth contemporary îssues as we as our deepy rooted tradîtîon of înquîry about the mora îfe. Our mîssîon îs to pubîsh schoary artîces în the ied of mora theoogy, as we as theoogîca treatments of reated topîcs în phîosophy, economîcs, poîtîca phîosophy, and psychoogy.Journa of Mora eoogyîs pubîshed semîannuay, wîth January and Juy îssues. e journa’s artîces are open-access, avaîabe at www.msmary.edu/jmt. Bound prînt îssues are avaîabe by request and at the annua conferences of the Socîety of Chrîstîan Ethîcs (Janu-ary) and the Cathoîc eoogîca Socîety of Amerîca (June). Artîces pubîshed în theJourna of Mora eoogyundergo at east two peer revîews. wî Authors are asked to submît artîces eectronîcay to jmt@msmary.edu and wî be înformed about the revîew process by e-maî. Submîssîons shoud be prepared for bînd revîew and con-form toChîcago Manua of Stye. Mîcroso Word format preferred. Edîtors assume that sub-mîssîons are not beîng sîmutaneousy consîdered for pubîcatîon în another venue. ISSN 2166-2851 (prînt), ISSN 2166-2118 (onîne).Journa of Mora eoogy îs pubîshed by Mount St. Mary’s Unîversîty, 16300 Od Emmîtsburg Road, Emmîtsburg, MD 21727. Copyrîght © 2012 îndîvîdua authors and Mount St. Mary’s Unîversîty. A rîghts reserved.
Except for brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permis sions. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401. Pîckwîck Pubîcatîons, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401. www.wipfandstock.com.ISBN 13: 9781625644510
A N O T E F R O M T H E I S S U E E D I T O R S
Love îs the begînnîngend of îfe. Ever and ythîng în between re-quîres attentîon and, more to thepoînt for us, the attentîveness of mora theoogîans. e commands to ove God and to ove neîghbor condîtîon a that we do. For thîs reason, an îssue dedîcated to ove seemed approprîate when the edîtorîa board was thînkîng through the irst fewyears of the JMT. However, “thînkîngthrough” îs not the same asputtîngwords topaper. Lîke ove îtsef, the îdea îs far easîer to come bythan îts embodîment. In our efforts, we hope that we have done haf asgood ajob as the edîtors and authors of the January2012 îssue. In that irst îssue, Da-vîd Coutîer and Wîîam Mattîson set a tone for thejourna bytak-îng what they caed a “geneaogîca” approach to method în mora theoogy. Sînce dîscussîons of theoogîca method can sometîmes become too abstract, Coutîer and Mattîson asked authors to ap-proach thequestîon of method through formatîve igures în the dîs-pîne. In most cases, students wrote about theîr teachers (e.g., James Keenan on Bernard HärîngCraî and g Steven Tîtus on Servaîs Pînckaers). Questîons of method were treated în terms of what înlu-entîa thînkers have înherîted andpassed on. e same baance of the abstract and concrete îs requîred of our îssue on ove. On one hand, we need cear thînkîngand concepts. As Dîana Frîtz Cates notes în the ead artîce, “[w]îthout an adequate conceptîon of ove, one cannot meanîngfuy say that one îs actîngfrom obedîence to the ove command.” On the other hand, we shoud be attentîve to what can be dîscovered through concrete encounters at home, through work, and în servîce to our neîghbors. In hîs dîs-cussîon of thephysîcîan-patîent reatîonshîp, Brîan Vockproposes that “[a]ny form of human endeavor… îs undermîned when an-guage îs evîscerated by abstractîon and sentîmentaîty, dîvorcîngwords from embodîed experîence.” Each artîce weaves together concept and encounter. However, there îs a contrast în emphasîs. ree essays emphasîze a more con-ceptua approach, engagîngand theorîsts of ove—and it- theorîes tîngy, omas Aquînas and hîs synthesîs of the tradîtîon feature promînentyîn each. ree other essays take specîic reatîonshîps as theîrpoînts of departure—reatîonshîps wîth thepoor, în heath care înstîtutîons, and among famîy.
e îssue has been organîzed so that the more theoretîca essays provîde the frame. In the irst artîce, Dîana Cates expores omas Aquînas’ account of ove as ît îs rooted în ageneraphîosophîca psychoogy. Next, Wîîam C. Mattîson brîngs omîstîc dîstînctîons to bear on a specîicprobem în contemporaryof ove, a accounts probem occasîoned înpart bythe îdeaîzatîon of romantîc ove sînce the ate nîneteenth century. At the other end of the voume, Chares Pînches and Davîd McCarthy examîne ove and îts connectîon to natura aw. A con-cudîngrevîew essay, byBernard Brady,provîdes a surveyand anay-sîs of recent work on ove bytheoo mora gîans. (Brady’s essaya îs mode for what we întend to offer în each îssue: a broad rangîngcon-sîderatîon of work în mora theoogyon a specîic topîc.) Wîthîn thîs frame we have set the three essays featurîng specîic encounters. Here our authors wrîte from theîr experîences— Margaret Pfeî as a Cathoîc Worker, Brîan Vock în theprofessîon of medîcîne, and Hoy Tayor Cooman as aparent. eîr moreper-sona approach îs no ess theoogîca, andperhaps more theoogîca for beîngîncarnatîona: dîspayîngand anayzîngthe features of ove from wîthîn specîic, chaengîngcaîngs în the word. We have severapeope to thank for hepîng us toproduce the voume: Tayor Sadarananda, Erîcka Dîxon, and Dae Phîîps for theîr formattîng andproof-readîng; edîtorîa board members for theîrquîck work în the revîewprocess; CîndyKokoskî for managîngbusîness matters; and Provost Davîd Rehm and Presîdent omas Powe of Mount St. Mary’s Unîversîtyfor theîr consîstent and strongsupport. —Davîd Matzko McCarthy & Joshua P. Hochschîd
Journa of Mora eoogy, Vo. 1, No. 2 (2012): 1-30 Love: A omistic Analysis DIANAFRITZCATESHRISTIANS ARE ENJOINED to ove God above a thîngs and theîr neîghbors as themseves. e faîthfu of every genera-whaCt ove îs. ey need a conceptîon that îs înformed by the tradîtîon tîon must determîne what ît means for them to be bound by a aw of ove. To begîn wîth, Chrîstîans need a good îdea of and by the best and worst of theîr own experîences, whîch they re-lect upon în îght of broader humanîstîc and scîentîic înquîry. Wîthout an adequate conceptîon of ove, one cannot meanîngfuy say that one îs actîng from obedîence to the ove command, choosîng to act în îght of ove as an end, actîng from ove as a motîve, or seek-îng to become a more ovîng person. CHRISTIANETHICS OFLOVEe anguage of ove appears frequenty în the hîstory of Chrîstîan th thought, but prîor to the 20 century few thînkers sought to deine ove or specîfy how ît îs best conceîved by persons who îdentîfy as 1 Chrîstîans. Over the past century, more attentîon has been focused on carîfyîng what ove îs, sortîng out îts varîous forms, and arguîng about whîch form best represents the Chrîstîan îdea. A strîkîng fea-ture of thîs recent îterature îs that ît îs orîented by the retrîeva of cassîc phîosophîca and bîbîca terms for ove, most notaby the 2 Greekeros,phîîa, andagape, and the Latîncarîtas. e use of these 1  As Jues Toner wrîtes, “It îs a strange and strîkîng fact that even those who wrîte best about ove devote very îtte space to consîderîng what ove îs… Aer a few par-agraphs on the nature of ove, there are ong dîscussîons about the kînds of ove, the power and effects of ove, the stages of growth în ove, the mora and psychoogîca norms for ove, the reatîon of ove wîth knowedge, sex, justîce, and so on. It îs as-sumed that readers and wrîter know what ove îs and agree on what ît îs.”e Expe-rîence of Love(Washîngton, D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968), 8-9. 2 Durîng the 1930’s Anders Nygren pubîshedAgape and Eros: e Chrîstîan Idea of LovePhîîp S. Watson (Chîcago: Unîversîty of Chîcago Press, 1982). In thîs, trans.
2
Dîana Frîtz Cates
terms can be hepfu în dîstînguîshîng kînds or dîmensîons of ove. It can aso be mîseadîng. It can reîfy concepts that were not hîstorîcay as stabe as they mîght now appear, and ît can cause us to bend au-thors’ vîews to it our expectatîons. If we brîng contemporary debates about Chrîstîan ove to the work of earîer thînkers în the tradîtîon, we wî îkey ask questîons that we woud not otherwîse ask, whîch îs good. Yet we mîght aso be îmîted by the terms of the debate as we consîder how these thînkers woud respond to our questîons. îs essay turns to omas Aquînas for guîdance în thînkîng about ove. e anaysîs îs înformed, but not bound, by recent dîscussîons of agape,eros,phîîa, andcarîtas. ere are good reasons to reconsîder Aquînas on ove, attendîng 3 to ove în îts most încusîve sense,amorAquînas, ove refers în. For part to an emotîon, and schoars across many dîscîpînes have been învestîgatîng the emotîons. Many studîes now demonstrate what Aquînas (and others) knew ong ago, whîch îs that emotîons can make crîtîca contrîbutîons to practîca înteîgence and to ethîca 4 decîsîon-makîng. Yet these studîes, some of whîch are cross-cutura, and others of whîch consîder nonhuman anîmas, raîse questîons about how to deine the object of our învestîgatîon. What areoughts, vaue judgments, ways of construîng the emotîons? sîgnîicance of events? Changes în the braîn and other parts of the body, the feeîng of these changes, the meanîng peope attach to such feeîngs? How can we know that someone îs feeîng an emotîon and whîch emotîon he îs feeîng? Can a person be mîstaken about hîs own emotîona state? If we cannot answer such questîons reasonaby we, we cannot successfuy make emotîons an object of shared în-quîry. We cannot be conident that, when we use the term “emotîon,” other peope wî brîng to mînd the same thîng we have în mînd. înluentîa text, Nygren drove a wedge betweenagapeanderosto ensure the breakup of the “carîtas synthesîs” and return Chrîstîans to an orîgîna and pure form of Chrîstîan ove. Many recent dîscussîons of ove în Chrîstîan ethîcs have Nygren’s work în vîew as they deine normatîve Chrîstîan ove wîth reference toagape,eros, phîîa,carîtas, and reated concepts. See, e.g., Josef Pîeper,Faîth, Hope, Love (San Francîsco: Ignatîus Press, 1997); M.C. D’Arcy,e Mînd and Heart of Love, Lîon and Unîcorn: A Study în Eros and Agape(London: Faber and Faber, 1953); Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethîca Anaysîs(New Haven: Yae Unîversîty Press, 1972); Barbara Hîk-ert Andosen, “Agape în Femînîst Ethîcs,”Journa of Reîgîous Ethîcs9, no. 1 (1981): 69-83; Edward Coîns Vacek,Love, Human and Dîvîne: e Heart of Chrîstîan Eth-îcs(Washîngton, D.C.: Georgetown Unîversîty Press, 1994); Tîmothy Jackson,Love Dîsconsoed: Medîtatîons on Chrîstîan Charîty (Cambrîdge: Cambrîdge Unîversîty Press,1999); Coîn Grant, “For the Love of God: Agape,”Journa of Reîgîous Ethîcs24, no. 1 (1996): 3-21; Edward Coîns Vacek, “Love, Chrîstîan and Dîverse: A Re-sponse to Coîn Grant,”Journa of Reîgîous Ethîcs24, no. 1 (1996): 29-34. 3 e reatîonshîp betweenamorandcarîtaswî be dîscussed subsequenty. 4  See J.-P. Changeux, A.R. Damasîo, W. Sînger, and Y. Chrîsten, eds.,Neurobîoogy of Human Vaues(Berîn: Sprînger-Verag, 2005).
Love: A omîstîc Anaysîs
3
Party în an effort to deine emotîons, some schoars of reîgîous studîes, theoogy, ethîcs, phîosophy, and mora psychoogy have 5 been studyîng Aquînas. Hîs account of the passîons or emotîons, presented în îts fuest form în theSumma theoogîae, îs stunnîng în îts scope, theoogîca depth, expanatory power, and psychoogîca 6 usefuness. Hîs anaysîs of the structure of emotîon, and of the rea-tîonshîp between emotîon, thought, and choîce, encourages the study 7 of the moraîty of emotîon. e atter area of înquîry îs împortant because ît îs not just any emotîon that contrîbutes to the effectîve exercîse of mora agency. Ony certaîn emotîons, fet în certaîn ways, aow persons to dîscern and respond to what îs reay împortant. When we consîder Aquînas’s theory of the emotîons în îght of hîs relectîons on the Chrîstîan mora îfe, we are enabed to return, wîth
5  See, e.g., Dîana Frîtz Cates,Aquînas on the Emotîons: A Reîgîous-Ethîca Inquîry(Washîngton, D.C.: Georgetown Unîversîty Press, 2009); Robert Mîner,omas Aquînas on the Passîons (Cambrîdge: Cambrîdge Unîversîty Press, 2009); Nîchoas E. Lombardo,e Logîc of Desîre: Aquînas on Emotîon(Washîngton, D.C.: Cathoîc Unîversîty of Amerîca Press, 2011); Peter Kîng, “Aquînas on the Passîons,”Aquî-nas’s Mora eory: Essays în Honor of Norman Kretzmann, eds. Scott MacDonad and Eeonore Stump (Ithaca: Corne Unîversîty Press, 1999); Marce Sarot, “God, Emotîon, and Corporeaîty: A omîstîc Perspectîve,”e omîst 58 (January 1994): 61-92; Danîe Westberg, “Emotîon and God: A Repy to Marce Sarot,”e omîst60 (January 1996): 109-121; Shawn D. Foyd, “Aquînas on Emotîon: A Re-sponse to Some Recent Interpretatîons,”Hîstory of Phîosophy Quartery 15, no. 2 (Aprî 1998): 161-175; Kevîn Whîte, “e Passîons of the Sou,”e Ethîcs of Aquî-nas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washîngton, D.C.: Georgetown Unîversîty Press, 2002), 103-115. 6  omas Aquînas,Summa theoogîae, ed. Petrî Carameo (Rome: Marîettî, 1950), hereaerST, cîted în the body of the text. In thîs essay I adhere, wîth ony mînor changes, to the transatîon of the Fathers of the Engîsh Domînîcan Provînce (Westmînster, MD: Chrîstîan Cassîcs, 1981). I use the term “emotîon” to refer to omîstîcpassîo, wîth the understandîng that the atter îs ordînarîy înluenced by the înteect and the wî în a human beîng. One can refer to an înteectua affectîon (affectus) or to a sîmpe act of the wî (sîmpex actus vountatîs) aso as an emotîon, but ît îs best to do so ony îf the affectîon or the act of the wî îs coordînated wîth an emotîon proper, whîch învoves a notîceabe (îf ony subte) bodîy change. Other-wîse, one projects an emotîona quaîty înto an înteectua ream where “feeîngs” are thought to occur, but these feeîngs have no notîceabe reatîonshîp to a body. When referrîng to ove în God ît îs best to refer to an affectîon or to a sîmpe act of the wî, rather than to an emotîon. For further relectîon on termînoogy, see Cates, Aquînas on the Emotîons, 92-96. 7  See, e.g., Caudîa Eîsen Murphy, “Aquînas on Our Responsîbîîty for Our Emo-tîons,”Medîeva Phîosophy and eoogy 8 (1999): 163-205; Robert C. Roberts, “omas Aquînas on the Moraîty of Emotîons,”Hîstory of Phîosophy Quartery9, no. 3 (Juy 1992): 287-305; Servaîs Pînckaers, “Reapproprîatîng Aquînas’s Account of the Passîons (1990),” trans. Craîg Steven Tîtus,e Pînckaers Reader: Renewîng omîstîc Mora eoogy, eds. John Berkman and Craîg Steven Tîtus (Washîngton, D.C.: Cathoîc Unîversîty of Amerîca Press, 2005), 273-287; Pau Gondreau, “e Passîons and the Mora Lîfe: Apprecîatîng the Orîgînaîty of Aquînas,”e omîst71 (2007): 419-450.
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Dîana Frîtz Cates
new resources, to the ethîcs of ove. What, for Aquînas, îs the emo-tîon of ove? What îs ît to fee thîs emotîon în an approprîate or vîr-tuous way? What îs the reatîonshîp between the emotîon of ove and the ove that Chrîstîans are to show toward God, sef, and neîghbor? Many Chrîstîan thînkers have argued, especîay sînce Kant, that Chrîstîan ove cannot be an emotîon or have an emotîona dîmen-sîon because we are passîve wîth respect to our emotîons. If our emo-tîons are not subject to our wî, we cannot reasonaby be command-ed by God to fee them, nor can we faîry demand thîs of ourseves and each other. We can be hed responsîbe for how we move our-8 seves to act, but not for how we are moved to fee. Many authors have maîntaîned, accordîngy, that Chrîstîan ove îs best conceîved as an înteectua attîtude or an act of the wî. For exampe, Norman Kretzmann înterprets Aquînas as sayîng that Chrîstîan ove îs a “[posîtîve] înteectîve attîtude” that îs “ratîona” and “unemotîon-9 a.” Gene Outka characterîzes neîghbor-ove as an equa and uncon-dîtîona regard that one extends “to each neîghbor qua human exîst-ent,” îrrespectîve of any dîstînguîshîng features of the other that 10 mîght evoke an emotîona response. Commony, neîghbor-ove îs
8 See Justîn Oakey,Moraîty and the Emotîons(London: Routedge, 1992), 122-147, for a dîscussîon of the way în whîch we can be responsîbe for thîngs over whîch we ack certaîn sorts of “contro,” both în the ream of actîon and în the ream of emo-tîon. 9  Norman Kretzmann, “Aquînas on God’s Joy, Love, and Lîberaîty,”e Modern Schoomanno. 1 (Nov. 1994): 129-130. Kretzmann’s concern îs maîny wîth 72, God’s ove, but he suggests that Chrîstîan ove wî îdeay îmîtate God’s ove. Kretzmann rîghty notes that, for Aquînas, God as irst prîncîpe does not undergo passîones. God does not have a body, and emotîons are motîons of the sensory appe-tîte that are medîated by bodîy organs. Yet God în Chrîst experîencedpassîones(Quaestîones dîsputatae de verîtate[Fundacîón Tomás de Aquîno, 2011, 26.8 http://www.corpusthomîstîcum.org/qdv25.htm], hereaerDV, cîted în the body of the text). Presumaby Chrîst experîenced ove not ony as an înteectua attîtude or a unîversa good wî, but aso as a body-resonant emotîon. Gîven that humans are beîngs who engage the word of vaue party vîa our sensory powers, Chrîstîans mîght reasonaby cutîvate vîrtuous ove by seekîng to îmîtate Chrîst în hîs passîbe human nature (STq. 15, a. 4; q. 46, a. 12). For a dîscussîon of the affectîvîty of III Chrîst that coud compîcate thîs suggestîon, however, see Lombardo,e Logîc of Desîre, chapter 6. See aso my revîew of the atter înModern eoogy28, no. 2 (Aprî 2012). 10 Outka,Agape, 12-13. Outka draws on Kîerkegaard who argues that Chrîstîan ove and the emotîon of ove are dîfferent thîngs that ought not to be confused. Chrîstîan ove has îts basîs în duty (“you SHALL ove”), whîe the emotîon of ove has îts basîs în persona preference (Kîerkegaard’s Wrîtîngs, XVI: Works of Love, eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Prînceton: Prînceton Unîversîty, 1998], 24-25). Kîerke-gaard does not dîsparage the emotîon of ove or the vaue of persona reatîonshîps as such. He sîmpy hods that for Chrîstîans the ethîca prîorîty îs the uncondîtîona wîshîng of a persons we and the practîce of assîstîng them în becomîng authentîc seves (62, 106-114). Emotîona ove for those who are near and dear can be appro-prîate, and even strangers may be oved în persona ways. One has the duty to ove
Love: A omîstîc Anaysîs5 represented as a form of benevoence or we-wîshîng that a person can and ought, în prîncîpe, to extend (ît îs mîseadîng, wîthout fur-ther dîscussîon, to say “fee”) toward everyone who crosses her 11 path. Edward Vacek bemoans the abstract and împersona quaîty of much that goes by the name of ove în Chrîstîan ethîcs. He argues that Chrîstîan ove încudes “anemotîonaapprecîatîon and concern 12 for the good of the beoved.” On Vacek’s vîew, “emotîons are [cog-nîtîve] acts by whîch we perceîve vaues în reaîty, and they are acts în whîch we are enîvened by reaîty’s goodness or repused by îts 13 evî.” Neîghbor-ove încudes respect for a person’s dîgnîty, but re-spect îs more than a hands-off attîtude or an absence of î-wî; ît îs 14 “an actua experîence of the precîousness of that person.” My own reated concern îs that neîghbor-ove can be dîssocîated, în the mînds of Chrîstîans, from the experîence of ordînary, embodîed emotîon. When thîs happens, Chrîstîans can say and beîeve that of course they ove theîr neîghbors as themseves—they woud not deîberatey cause other peope harm, and they generay wîsh others we as hu-man beîngs—but they do not îke certaîn peope very much, on an emotîona eve. Indeed, there are some peope they detest. What does neîghbor-ove requîre when ît comes to peope whom we ind emotîonay dîsturbîng? Does ît requîre that we exercîse vîrtuous emotîon în theîr regard? Does ît requîre that wefeeove for any them? Aquînas does not address exacty these questîons, but he deines the emotîon of ove, he deines Chrîstîan ove, and he suggests that both modes of ovîng can and ought to be determîned by vîrtue. He recognîzes that there are natura îmîts to the ove and servîce that we can extend to others, but he argues that vîrtuous ove wî îdeay în-form a that a person îs and does. Just as sîgnîicanty, he artîcuates a mora psychoogy that dîstînguîshes severa ways în whîch a person the person one sees (160-161), and attendîng to a stranger în hîs partîcuarîty can înspîre affectîon. However, a emotîona ove must be permeated and transformed by conscîence (135). at îs, a persons must be regarded irst and foremost as fe-ow humans who, îke the sef, have a unîque reatîonshîp to God and have destînîes that can be reaîzed ony în the context of that reatîonshîp. Moreover, the Chrîstîan must not dîsregard the humanîty of anyone for whom she happens not to fee affec-tîon or whom she dîsîkes. She has the duty to cose her eyes to another’s partîcuarî-ty îf the atter keeps her from obeyîng God’s command (68). 11 Conceîvîng of Chrîstîan ove as extensîve benevoence does notrequîrenegectîng the emotîona dîmensîon of such ove. John P. Reeder, Jr., argues convîncîngy that extensîve benevoence buîds on emotîona capabîîtîes that are deveoped în the context of specîa reatîons. “Extensîve Benevoence,”Journa of Reîgîous Ethîcs26, no. 1 (Sprîng 1998): 47-70. 12 Vacek,Love, Human and Dîvîne, 160. 13 Vacek,Love, Human and Dîvîne, 7. 14 Vacek,Love, Human and Dîvîne, 162.
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Dîana Frîtz Cates
can ove God, sef, and others. He deîneates cosey-reated phenom-ena, such as emotîons, desîres of varîous kînds, judgments of varîous kînds, and motîons of the wî. When we become famîîar wîth hîs mora psychoogy, we acquîre powerfu toos that aow us, îf we so desîre, to tease apart and sort out aspects of our înterîor îves that are oen jumbed together, not ony în experîence but aso în relectîve thought. ese toos can hep us to target specîic features of our character on whîch we woud îke to work. ey can hep us to un-cover subte forms of sef-deceptîon, especîay îf we use the toos wîth modern crîtîca theory în mînd. Aquînas’s thought învîtes Chrîstîans, în partîcuar, to consîder more honesty what ît means to be ovîng persons. Interpretîng Aquînas on ove poses chaenges. Schoars have not-ed many puzzes that he e to posterîty—puzzes concernîng how 15 the many thîngs that he saîd about ove it together. We wî not examîne the vast secondary schoarshîp on thîs topîc or anayze Aquînas’s texts în a eve of detaî that woud aow us deinîtîvey to resove împortant dîfficutîes în Aquînas studîes. Instead, în a more constructîve veîn and în the servîce of a broady omîstîc mora theoogy and psychoogy, thîs essay dîstînguîshes and reates severa forms of ove that are operatîve în Aquînas’s thought—forms that persons woud do we to be abe to dîstînguîsh and reate for them-seves, în tîmes of relectîon, îf they aspîre to a îfe of ove wîthîn the context of Chrîstîan faîth. A subordînate aîm of the essay îs to show how thîs mutî-faceted conceptîon of ove aows Chrîstîans to ad-dress some negected questîons about Chrîstîan ove and emotîon. îs essay uses some categorîes that Aquînas does not use, but categorîes that hîghîght features of hîs thought that mîght otherwîse be negected. It aso hods fast to dîstînctîons he makes but some-tîmes sets asîde as he engages thînkers who have dîfferent ways of takîng about ove. Fînay, thîs essay focuses on the Chrîstîan tradî-tîon, but readers are învîted to consîder whether the way ove îs aîd out here mîght be transposabe înto terms that are congenîa to other tradîtîons or paths.
15  To begîn consîderîng these puzzes, consîder Frederîck E. Crowe, “Compacency and Concern în the ought of St. omas,”eoogîca Studîes20, nos. 1, 2, and 3 (March, June, and Sept., 1959): 1-39, 198-230, 343-395; Patrîck A. Messîna, “Love Lost and Found: e Ambîguîtîes ofAmor,CarîtasandConcupîscentîaîn St. om-as Aquînas’Summa eoogîae,”Confessîons of Love: e Ambîguîtîes of Greek Eros and Latîn Carîtas, eds. Craîg J. N. de Pauo et a. (New York: Peter Lang), 55-73; Guy Mansînî, “Dupex Amorand the Structure of Love în Aquînas,”omîstîca (1995): 127-196.