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Global Logistic Chain Security

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218 Pages
English

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The ‘100% scanning’ law, or House Resolution 1 (H.R. 1), aims to protect US territory against terrorist risks likely to affect the global logistic chain. A unilateral step, it may be perceived as a disguised protectionist measure which would transfer the risk of ‘seacurity’ to its partners, particularly if the principle of reciprocity does not apply. In this changing economic (over 325 million containers handled, under 0.5% of which are currently scanned) and regulatory context (following the SAFE framework of standards developed by the World Customs Organization), this forward-looking work parts from a single hypothesis: what will happen if the US 100 % scanning law adopted by Congress in July 2007 actually enters into application on 1 July 2012, or even sooner should there be an attack in the United States, and what are the alternatives ?

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Exrait

GLOBAL LOGISTIC
CHAIN SECURITY:
Economic Impacts
of the US 100 %
Container Scanning Law

GLOBAL LOGISTIC
CHAIN SECURITY:
Economic Impacts
of the US 100 %
Container Scanning Law

By Frédéric CARLUER,
Professor in Territorial Management, University of Le Havre
(CIRTAI), Associate Researcher, Normandy Business School:
frederic.carluer@univ-lehavre.fr
and Scientific Director of SEFACIL Research Institute

With the collaboration of:
Yann ALIX,Professor in Port Management, Normandy
Business School, Director of IPER (port training
and research institute) – Head of Logistics Department
Olivier JOLY,Associate Professor in Spatial Planning,
University of Le Havre

University of Le Havre study
commissioned by the World Customs Organization (WCO)

17 rue des Métiers
14123 CORMELLES-LE-ROYAL

This report, produced at the request of the Secretary General of the World Customs Organization
(WCO), does not necessarily reflect the ideas of this Organization. The authors accept full
responsibility.

The authors would like to thank G. Gaulier (CEPII-Banque de France), G. Daudin (OFCE), B. Steck
and S. Deprez (University of Le Havre) for their remarks, criticisms and comments on the first version
of this report, and also J. Ritt and P. Ollivier (Soget S.A.) and L. Pascal (French Customs) for
facilitating contacts, and T. Derrey and M. Zenati (University of Le Havre) for their help with logistics.

er
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collectif sans autorisation des ayants droit. Or, cette pratique s’est généralisée dans les établissements
d’enseignement supérieur, provoquant une baisse brutale des achats de livres, au point que la
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aujourd’hui menacée.

Nous rappelons donc qu’il est interdit de reproduire intégralement ou partiellement sur quelque
support que ce soit le présent ouvrage sans autorisation de l’auteur, de son éditeur ou du Centre français
d’exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) 3, rue Hautefeuille, 75006 Paris (Code de la propriété
intellectuelle, articles L. 122-4, L. 122-5 et L. 335-2).

ISBN : 978-2-84769-096-5

© Éditions EMS, 2008

CONTENTS

Preface,Brian Slack.................................................................................

I – Introduction........................................................................................

II – Macro-economic analysis of US-bound
container trade flows................................................................................
2.1 – US imports of maritime containers: global data...........................
2.2 – Main trade partners on import......................................................
2.3 – US ports faced with the challenges of growth
and logistic reorganization............................................................
2.4 – Prospective analysis of trade.........................................................

III – Micro-economic analysis of the actors
involved in securing the logistic chain...................................................
3.1 – Maritime container scanning market
and economic perspectives..........................................................
3.1.1 – Sectoral analysis: key technical-industrial
opportunities ..........................................................................
3.1.2 – Summary of main scanner manufacturers
and administrators .................................................................
3.1.3 – Technological revolution and strategic opportunities ...........
3.1.4 – Market structure, between scanning equipment
manufacturers and service providers.....................................
3.1.5 – A few large internationally recognized actors and
a multitude of service providers ...........................................
3.2 – Port surveys...................................................................................
3.2.1 – Methodology and standard questionnaire .............................
3.2.2 – Qualitative analysis of the standard questionnaires..............
3.2.3 – Exchanges of experience: perspectives
and cost analysis....................................................................
IV – Impacts of the “100% scanning law”:
potential scenarios....................................................................................
4.1 – Potential macro-economic impacts of
the application of the US law .......................................................
4.2 – Technical-logistic developments underlying
the potential scenarios ..................................................................

V – Conclusion.........................................................................................

VI – Prospects..........................................................................................

VII – Annexes...........................................................................................
Annex 1. Traffic in US-bound maritime containers
in 2006 ...................................................................................

1

1

3

5

21
21
23

32
44

5

5

5

5

5

5

58
65

73

79
85
86
94

146

163

163

169

175

183

185

186

Annex 2. List of CSI ports (October 2007)...........................................
Annex 3. List of contacts and interviews...............................................

VIII – Lists of tables, figures, graphs and maps..................................

IX – Bibliography.....................................................................................

X – Internet references.............................................................................

194
195

199

203

213

The Secretary General

Re:

WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES DOUANES

Established in 1952 as the Customs Co-operation Council
Créée en 1952 sous le nom de Conseil de coopération douanièr

Macro- and micro-economic analyses of the impact on international trade
of the US law on 100% scanning of maritime containers before loading.

The above law, known as the ‘9/11 Commission Recommendations’, will affect
com m ercialtransactions with the United States estimated at some USD
500billion, andis expected to have a not inconsiderable impact on the
operations of more than 600 ports throughout the world.

The WCO would like an intensive study to be made of the impact of this law on
international trade. It is entrusting the University of Le Havre with this research
task.

The study is to cover the following points. This list is by no means exhaustive
and will be regularly reviewed through contact between University of Le Havre
researchers and the Secretariat.

1. Identify the volume of transactions (US imports) concerned and the foreign
ports concerned in each region of the world (Europe, Asia, Africa, South
America).

2. Measure the costs and determine the additional costs (human resources,
immobilization, transhipment) associated with implementation of the law.

3. Determine whether it will be possible to implement the legislation effectively in
the countries of export, particularly developing countries.

4. Analyze the foreseeable consequences of this law on international trade
(rising costs, slower traffic, elimination of certain ports as a result of
polarization) and forecast potential future scenarios.

5. Determine whether 100%scanning can ensure zero risk and measure,
approximately, its comparative feasibility and reliability in relation to risk
analysis.

Michel Danet.
Brussels, 28 September 2007

House Resolution 1

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007
(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)

SEC. 1701. CONTAINER SCANNING AND SEALS

Container Scanning - Section 232(b) of the SAFE Ports Act (6
USC. 982(b)) is amended to read as follows:

(b) Full-Scale Implementation

(1) IN GENERAL - A container that was loaded on a vessel in a
foreign port shall not enter the United States (either directly or via
a foreign port) unless the container was scanned by nonintrusive
imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign
port before it was loaded on a vessel.

(2) APPLICATION - Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to
containers loaded on a vessel in a foreign country on or after the
earlier of—
– (A) July 1, 2012; or
– (B)such other date as may be established by the Secretary
under paragraph (3).

(3) ESTABLISHMENT OF EARLIER DEADLINE - The
Secretary shall establish a date under (2)(B) pursuant to the lessons
learned through the pilot integrated scanning systems established
under section 231.

(4) EXTENSIONS - The Secretary may extend the date specified
in paragraph (2)(A) or (2)(B) for 2 years, and may renew the
extension in additional 2-year increments, for containers loaded in a port
or ports, if the Secretary certifies to Congress that at least two of the
following conditions exist:
– (A)Systems to scan containers in accordance with paragraph
(1) are not available for purchase and installation.
– (B)Systems to scan containers in accordance with paragraph
(1) do not have a sufficiently low false alarm rate for use in the
supply chain.


10 GLOBALLOGISTIC CHAIN SECURITY...
– (C)Systems to scan containers in accordance with paragraph
(1) cannot be purchased, deployed, or operated at ports overseas,
including, if applicable, because a port does not have the physical
characteristics to install such a system.
– (D)Systems to scan containers in accordance with paragraph
(1) cannot be integrated, as necessary, with existing systems.
– (E)Use of systems that are available to scan containers in
accordance with paragraph (1) will significantly impact trade
capacity and the flow of cargo.
– (F)Systems to scan containers in accordance with paragraph
(1) do not adequately provide an automated notification of
questionable or high-risk cargo as a trigger for further inspection by
appropriately trained personnel.

(5) EXEMPTION FOR MILITARY CARGO - Notwithstanding
any other provision in the section, supplies bought by the Secretary
of Defense and transported in compliance with section 2631 of title
10, United States Code, and military cargo of foreign countries are
exempt from the requirements of this section.

6) REPORT ON EXTENSIONS - An extension under paragraph
(4) for a port or ports shall take effect upon the expiration of the
60day period beginning on the date the Secretary provides a report to
Congress that:
– (A) states what container traffic will be affected by the extension;
– (B) provides supporting evidence to support the Secretary’s
certification of the basis for the extension; and
– (C)explains what measures the Secretary is taking to ensure
that scanning can be implemented as early as possible at the port or
ports that are the subject of the report.

(7) REPORT ON RENEWAL OF EXTENSION - If an extension
under paragraph (4) takes effect, the Secretary shall, after one year,
submit a report to Congress on whether the Secretary expects to
seek to renew the extension.

(8) SCANNING TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS - In
implementing paragraph (1), the Secretary shall:
– (A)establish technological and operational standards for
systems to scan containers;
– (B)ensure that the standards are consistent with the global
nuclear detection architecture developed under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002; and


HOUSE RESOLUTION 111
– (C)co-ordinate with other Federal agencies that administer
scanning or detection programs at foreign ports.

(9) INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS
- In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with
appropriate Federal departments and agencies and private sector
stakeholders, and ensure that actions under this section do not
violate international trade obligations, and are consistent with the
World Customs Organization framework, or other international
obligations of the United States.’

(b) Deadline for Container Security Standards and Procedures
Section 204(a)(4) of the SAFE Port Act (6 USC. 944(a)(4)) is
amended by:

(1) striking “(1) DEADLINE FOR ENFORCEMENT -” and
inserting the following

(1) DEADLINE FOR ENFORCEMENT:
(A) ENFORCEMENT OF RULE -’; and

(2) adding at the end the following:

(B) INTERIM REQUIREMENT - If the interim final rule
described in paragraph (2) is not issued by April 1, 2008, then:

(i) effective not later than October 15, 2008, all containers in
transit to the United States shall be required to meet the requirements of
International Organization for Standardization Publicly Available
Specification 17712 standard for sealing containers; and

(ii) the requirements of this subparagraph shall cease to be
effective upon the effective date of the interim final rule issued pursuant
to this subsection.


12 GLOBALLOGISTIC CHAIN SECURITY...

List of abbrevations

AAPA: American Association of Port Authorities
AEO: Authorized Economic Operator
AFP: Air and Frontier Police
ASP: Advanced Spectroscopic Portals
ATDI: Advanced Trade Data Initiative
ATS: Automated Targeting System
C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
CBP: Customs and Border Protection
CSI: Container Security Initiative
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DOT: Department of Transportation
FTZ: Foreign Trade Zone
GAO: Government Accountability Office
H.R. 1: House Resolution 1
IAPH: International Association of Ports and Harbors
IATA: International Air Transport Association
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization
ICS: International Container Security
ICT: International Calls for Tender
IMO: International Maritime Organization
IRU: International Road Union
ISPS: International Ship and Port Security
MARAD: Maritime Administration
MTS: Maritime Transportation System
NII: Non-Intrusive Inspection
ROI: Return on investment
SAFE port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
SBInet: Secure Border Initiative
SFI: Secure Freight Initiative
TEU: Twenty-foot-equivalent unit
TRB: Transport Research Board
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WSC: World Shipping Council

Preface

Brian Slack,
Ph.D. Professor Emeritus – Concordia University

Just when seaports and the maritime industry in general has more
or less adjusted to the wave of new security regulations imposed
after 9/11, in 2008 a new initiative with far-reaching implications
has been enacted by the Congress of the United States. The
proposed measures calling for 100% inspection of containers destined
for the United States are radical and draconian, not least because the
burden of implementation falls upon non-US ports. This study is the
first comprehensive review of the situation. By explaining the key
role US trade plays in international trade, by describing the
legislation itself, and by providing a survey of scanning technology, this
research sets a context for impacts.
Most significantly, this global work provides a glimpse of the
initial reactions of the maritime industry to the proposed new security
initiative. Interviews across a sample of port authorities around the
world reveal remarkable diversity of opinion. This research
indicates that authorities’ responses range from the pragmatic to the
incredulous, and from those who see advantages to those who
foresee nothing but problems. It makes interesting reading to discover
why reactions are so variable. It will be intriguing to see in the
future how reactions evolve and shift, will the initial varied opinions
coalesce for example?
This pioneering book is essential reading for all in the maritime
industry as well as governments and international agencies that will
have to address the issues in the coming years. Security is now more
than ever a central issue in maritime transport.

I – Introduction

“The new security imperative will be an everyday challenge for
transportation providers and ports, in terms of operations and
resources, until security is integrated into everyday operations. The
goal of both industry and the government is to protect the nation
against the catastrophic impact of a terrorist act and at the same
time not hamper the efficient flow of trade, which would disrupt the
nation’s economy. To date, ports have completed risk assessments on
the vulnerabilities of their facilities, proposed security measures to
ameliorate those risks, and have started implementing and paying
for them. These measures include security personnel for gates and
patrols, fencing, lighting, cameras, and other surveillance measures
such as inspection requirements, radiation detection, and cargo
tracking”(Department of Transportation [2005, pp. 12-13]).

Efforts to secure trade in goods go back 3,500 years, when the first
land and sea trade routes were already well guarded. The danger then
was from pillage. The September 11, 2001 attacks mark a huge
ideological shift, with the threat now from so-called “civilizational
terrorism”, where transport becomes at once the conduit of the threat and
the vector of destruction (Greenberg [2006], Sheffi, Rice [2003],
Walkenshort, Dihel [2002], OECD [2002]). The ideological bedrock
of terrorism is to desire to shock consciences through the sheer
number of victims while jamming the global trade system in order,
ultimately, to challenge the dominant capitalist model of liberal
obedience. The transport flow becomes the target, the container the
medium of the attack, the port the receptacle (The Economist [2001],
Sheffi [2001]), whence the desire of the international organizations to
make every effort to strengthen“seacurity”(Van de Voort [2003]).
A radical change of scale is taking place in our apprehension of a
changing and complex threat: the spatial scale above all, where no
crossing point can be neglected on a market which is essentially
more and more global (Hummels [2006], Slater [2000]). Then the

16 GLOBALLOGISTIC CHAIN SECURITY...

quantitative and qualitative scales, with trade in goods growing
continually, in terms of tonnage and value alike (ISL [2006], Kumar,
Hoffmann [2002]). And finally the time scale, with transport flows
based on controlled transit times between each link in the
integrated transport chain (Nordåset al.[2006]; Hummels [2001a]). This is
the background against which the US authorities are advocating an
optimization of global and effective securing of trade flows, as
manifested in the “House Resolution One” (H.R. 1) vote. The challenge
is to invent a virtuous system of transport where tighter control
would, in the long term, allow more fluid secure trade flows (even
if the bottlenecks should be inevitable short-term), themselves
vectors of greater market value ultimately spawning greater production
and consumption flows in a secure world market.
There are four key issues:
•1 – Ideological and geopolitical.Each stakeholder in the world
supply chain must feel involved and be prepared to change their
behaviour in order to submit to mutual safeguarding of all
elements of the integrated logistics chain. Trust in partnership is
essential for the development of this understanding and the
involvement of a network of partners. Obviously, international
organizations, particularly the World Customs Organization
(WCO [2002]), have a key role to play.
•2 – Managerial.An organizational revolution is needed for
optimal management of the staff, materials and procedures vital
to the secure processing of physical flows (associated with the
available land) and information flows (associated with a
powerful IT system; Caldwell [2008]).
•3 – Economic and financial.The installation of the equipment,
services and maintenance of materials, and the knowledge and
skills of the millions of people involved in securing the
integrated world transport chain (maritime transport only in the case
of this study) need to be translated into the costs of the
“logistics of globalization” (Daudin [2003]).
•4 – Technical and technological.The challenge lies in the
design and production of reliable, rapid and practical solutions
which function in a network for real-time protection without a
major impact on the fluidity of the international containerized
system (Rice, Caniato [2003]).
While revolutionizing global freight security appears inevitable,
the question remains of how to implement that change effectively.
This first study testifies to the magnitude of the challenges to be


INTRODUCTION17
faced and looks at the long-term outlook for 100% scanning of
container transport.
Having established this context, it appears logical to return to the
question of how security and facilitation measures might themselves
strengthen the dynamics of the global logistic chain (Rice, Spayd
[2005], Closs, McGarrell [2004]) or, conversely, limit its
development and fluidity (Wilson [2007]). In fact, if logistics chains
interpenetrate and diversify, going as far as to cover all types of shipment
and all continents, controlling those chains could be exponentially
complicated in safety and security terms, safety in this context
describing protective measures in the face of malevolence, criminal
behaviour and terrorism, and security referring to involuntary
technical malfunctions (Les Echos[2008, p. 3]). To provide a better
understanding of these challenges, it is vital to return to the idea of a
global logistic chain, and in particular the operational aspect.
Simply put, the global logistics chain integrates the following
three operational and infrastructural elements:
• 1 – logistics operations from the point at which the shipment is put
together by the shipper or their agent down to the departure of the
goods on board the vessel. These operations cover the processing
of the goods loaded into containers prior to dispatch by sea, in
particular warehousing, storage, packaging and packing the container;
• 2 – management and processing of the information required for
the organization and smooth conduct of logistics and
administrative operations within and outside ports;
• 3– multi-modal logistic infrastructure elements (Arviset al.
[2007]), namely:
+ support networks, whether road, rail or inland waterways;
+ dedicatedstorage and cargo handling areas (zones): logistics
platforms, warehouses, dedicated terminals, storage areas adjacent
to quay walls, quays, and container packing areas;
+ transportinvolved in the logistic chain: trucks, trains, barges,
vessels, etc.;
+ means of cargo handling involved in the physical manipulation
of goods and/or their containers/packing materials: goods handling
carts, straddle carriers, stackers, tractors and mafi trailers, cranes
and gantries;
+ the equipment and technologies involved in operating the port
system: tolls (kiosks), traffic and parking zone, monitoring and
identification systems;


18 GLOBALLOGISTIC CHAIN SECURITY...
+ and communications systems (telephones, fax, telex, e-mail, vhf,
sms, wap, wifi, internet) and systems for exchanging and processing
information (such as the Community Information System AP+).
Like facilitation, therefore, securing the global logistic chain
concerns both physical flows and flows of information from the
starting point right down to the final consumer (WCO [2005]). Each link
in the chain depends on the previous link for continuity,
synchronization and ultimately a better level of service for the client
(Christopher, Peck [2004]); this demands seamless traceability,
which has to be financed (Dulbecco, Laporte [2003]; Fabbe-Costes
[2006]). The security dimension thus becomes an integral part of
logistic chain performance. A range of security conditions must be
met for the goods to progress smoothly along the global logistic
chain, including increasing Customs’ security-checking capacity,
reducing specific vulnerabilities in a region or sector, developing
global security standards, and developing and deploying
technological solutions for security purposes.
Transposed into the US context, this dual imperative of security
and facilitation constitutes a major human and technological
challenge, namely how to secure 361 US ports and 24,000 miles of
seaways by drastic internal and external measures, such as ‘100%
scanning’ for instance, without the global logistic chain suffering as a
result of this new rule.

What do we actually mean when we talk about the H.R. 1 “100%
scanning” law? What does it mean for the world maritime
container market? For the US container market?
In the middle of this decade, a total of around 325 million boxes
were handled in around 600 port container terminals. An average of
around 18% were empty boxes, due to chronic imbalances between
the major intercontinental production and consumption zones.
Hence around 250 million boxes were handled in world maritime
and inland port terminals, with the United States representing
oneeighth of this traffic. Of this international total, around 225 million
(90%) is concentrated on the major-East-West routes and the key
hubs of South-East Asia, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. By
way of reference, an average of at most 0.5% of the total number of
maritime boxes having been physically scanned, the current world
market could be considered to total some 1.2 million scans.
Evidently, regional disparities complicate the reading of the world
market a little more: for instance, Canada has announced that it


INTRODUCTION19
scans a minimum 3% of all boxes, and Australia, looks sets to
increase its scans from 5,000 to 130,000 a year (out of a total
4.8 million TEU in 2006, which also approaches 3%).
However, these world market estimates of container scanning have
been turned upside down since the September 2001 attack on US
soil. With the ‘Container Security Initiative’ (CSI), 59 ports (Annex
2) representing more than 85% of exports to the United States (out
of a total of 18 million TEU in 2006) are obliged to scan containers
identified as ‘high risk’ following the analysis of intelligence
information relating to the movement of containerized goods. And under
H.R. 1, a market value of almost 500 billion would be subject to full
scanning by 2012, corresponding, according to various growth
forecasts for container traffic on the major East-West routes, to a total of
almost 30 million containers (TEU) mainly from Chinese, Korean,
Japanese and West European ports, and more recently from
SouthEast Asia too (although this growth slowed considerably in 2007:
+0.2% against more than 10% on average over the last ten years).
Underlining the economic challenge, the US scanning market alone
cost around USD 380 million in 2006 and this activity is forecast to
triple by 2013 to more than USD 1.2 billion.
In this changing economic and regulatory context this research
study, which partly comprises economic forecasting, parts from a
single hypothesis: what will happen if the US 100% scanning law
adopted by Congress in July 2007 actually enters into application
on 1 July 2012, and what are the alternatives?
From the outset, a number of questions, although interesting, are
not covered by the in-depth analysis, in particular:
– thepertinence of the law: is it judicious? Necessary? Does it
come at the right moment?
– the effectiveness of the law: will it be followed? Will it be
possible even to apply it?
– equality:do all ports (all countries) start from a level playing
field in terms of implementing this law? If not, will they be given
support, or an adjustment period?
These questions are of course implicit in our study, but will be
touched on only in the economic forecasting section, which rejects
a number of potential scenarios.
Having described the hypothesis underlying the research, it is
important to describe and estimate the likely consequences of the
law from the viewpoint of existing and potential macro-economic
dynamics (retrospective analysis of flows of maritime containers


20 GLOBALLOGISTIC CHAIN SECURITY...
entering the United States) and micro-economic dynamics (key
actors in the scanning sector: manufacturers and managers).
Our study will, therefore, be divided into three sections:
– the first will examine the macro-economic impacts of this law,
in other words analyzing the origin of trade flows and the
geographical dynamic of those flows, pointing to the likely appearance
of interconnected global megaports as a result (polarization).
– the second part will assess the micro-economic impacts, i.e. the
structure and dynamics of the scanning sector globally and the new
strategies of actors likely to emerge with strong impacts in terms of
port reorganizations and optimization of logistics chains, and
provide an initial assessment of the unit cost of a scanned container.
– finally,the third section will attempt to construct different
potential scenarios based on the preceding macro- and
micro-economic results combined with a large number of interviews and
different surveys carried out in ten ports and several key bodies
throughout the world.

II - MACRO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
USBOUND CONTAINER TRADE FLOWS

Proper evaluation of the economic dynamics likely to be affected
by the 100% scanning law requires an in-depth study of the flow of
containers entering the United States. Evidently, if a measure as
restrictive as 100% scanning were to enter into force, bilateral trade
flows, and more particularly access to the US market, would be
extremely unequal for the different countries throughout the world
(Davies, Weinstein [2003], Eaton, Kortum [2002]). This is why
many countries are rebelling against the veiled protectionist nature
of a measure which goes well beyond the usual regional preference
measures (Garay, Estevadeordal [1995], Oguledo, Macphee [1994])
and an economic opening-up at variable geometry (Fink et al.
[2002], Carluer [2007b]). A global overview of containers by
continent of origin (1997-2006; section 1), a detailed and mapped
analysis of the key trade partners and their dynamic (section 2), the
current situation of US ports and the key projects underway (section 3),
as well as a vision of the potential reality of US trade in 2012
(section 4), form the essential bases of this study.

2.1 US imports of maritime containers: global data

A single figure sums up the dynamics of the US container market
1
on import: from less than 7 million containers ten years ago, US
imports now total almost 20 million TEU (out of over 100 million
worldwide from 2005 according to UNCTAD [2007a, p. 16]),
equating to 137% growth over that period or more than 10% per
year on average. The impacts on port organization are manifold, and

1
On a global scale, container traffic (imports and exports) increased from 137 to 417 million
between 1995 and 2006, increasing at 11% per year compared to a little under 7% in the United States,
although the US still represents 11% of today’s traffic against more than 16% in 1995 (World Trade
Organization [2006]).