CIA : Conseils donnés à ses agents pour passer les frontières - Doc 1

CIA : Conseils donnés à ses agents pour passer les frontières - Doc 1

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Document révélé par Wikileaks - Ne pas avoir l'air débraillé et ne pas payer en liquide: ce sont quelques uns des conseils donnés à ses espions par la CIA pour passer les frontières, publiés dimanche par WikiLeaks.



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Published 22 December 2014
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CIA Assessment on Surviving Secondary
Screening at Airports While Maintaining Cover
WikiLeaks release: December 21, 2014
Keywords: CIA, airport, screening, passport, visa, Schengen, EU, customs,
security, border, Hungary, Bahrain, Mauritius, Bulgaria, Japan, Russia,
Chile, Czech, Zambia, Pakistan, South Africa, Venezuela, Mexico,
Kurdish, Turkish, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Syria
Restraint: SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN (originator controlled)/(no foreign
Title: Surviving Secondary: An Identity Threat Assessment of Secondary
Screening Procedures at International Airports
Date: September 2011
Organisation: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Author: CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program, from the
Identity Intelligence Center (i2c) within the Directorate of Science and
Pages: 14
This is a secret document produced by the CIA's CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program
to explain and advise CIA operatives on how to deal with secondary screening at airports, as they travel
to and from covert CIA operations using false ID, including into and out of Europe. The document details
specific examples of operatives being stopped under secondary screening at various ariports around the
world; how and why the person was and offers advice on how to deal with such circumstances
and minimise the risks if stopped to continue maintaining cover. The document was created for
distribution within the organisation and other officials who hold appropriate clearances at Executive
Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government. The document's overarching predominant advice
is to maintain cover, "no matter what". SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN
CL BY: 2313665
CL REASON: 1.4(c), (d)
DECL ON: 20360926
DRV FROM: LIA s-06, Multiple Sources
Introduction (U)
Secondary screening—a potentially lengthy and detailed look by airport offcials at
passengers not passing initial scrutiny—can signifcantly stress the identities of
operational travelers. Border-control offcers at international airports use primary screening
to quickly evaluate arriving passengers and identify those that may not be admissible, such as
illegal immigrants, narcotics traffckers and other criminals, terrorists, or intelligence offcers.
For countries with authoritarian regimes, airport offcials may also want to deny entry to
foreign political activists or nongovernmental organization (NGO) offcials. Security or customs
inspectors can refer travelers to secondary when they fnd weapons, drugs, or other contraband
on their persons or in their baggage. (C//NF)
Referral to secondary screening can occur if irregularities or questions arise during
any stage of airport processing—immigration, customs, or security—and regardless
of whether the traveler is arriving, in transit, or departing. Offcials may also randomly
select travelers. The resulting secondary screening can involve in-depth and lengthy
questioning, intrusive searches of personal belongings, cross-checks against external
databases, and collection of biometrics—all of which focus signifcant scrutiny on an operational
traveler. (S//NF)
This study examines triggers for secondary selection used at various international airports, the
range of subsequent scrutiny of identity, and traveler responses that are most likely to pass
secondary inspection with cover intact. For the study, CHECKPOINT researched available
all-source intelligence reporting but also incorporated a number of secondary screening
experiences from operational travelers. The information cut-off date is 31 May 2010. (S//NF)
NOTE: Although the information available is suffcient to provide general insights into the
secondary screening criteria and procedures that travelers may experience at foreign airports,
it is insuffciently detailed, comprehensive, and timely to provide tactical intelligence
for operational travelers using nonoffcial cover. Moreover, the examples cited in the study
illustrate the range of potential experiences but do not evaluate specifc airports. (S//NF)
This fnished intelligence product contains reporting that carries the ORCON dissemination
control but has been pre-approved by the originator for distribution to offcials who hold
appropriate clearances at Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government.
Sharing this product with other Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government
does not require contacting CHECKPOINT or reporting originators before dissemination.
Recipients must obtain originator approval prior to written or verbal communication of any portion
of this product to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities and for all other uses not pre-approved
by the originator. (U//FOUO)
Pre-Arrival Screening information. Countries requiring advance
passenger information include Australia, Although selection for secondary
Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, India, screening frequently occurs while
Japan, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, travelers are at the airport answering
Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the
questions from immigration offcers,
United Kingdom, and the United States. PNR authorities may also preselect passengers
information comes from airline reservation because of some fags in their visa
systems and contains personal information applications or airline records. Many
such as credit card number, e-mail address, countries issue visas upon arrival, however,
and seating preference. (U)
nearly 50 countries require US
touristpassport holders to submit visa applications Security services lacking APIS or PNR
before travel. For holders of US diplomatic information may have other arrangements to
or offcial passports, the number of countries receive passenger manifests ahead of time.
requiring visas before arrival rises to over For example, the Airport Police Intelligence
120. Security and intelligence services Brigade (BIPA) of the Chilean Investigative
participating in vetting visa applications, either Police does not routinely obtain advance
comprehensively or on an ad hoc basis, passenger manifests but can request the
include those of Georgia, Libya, Pakistan, information from airlines on an ad hoc basis
Russia, Syria, and Uzbekistan. (S//OC/NF) to search for targets of interest. Strict privacy
laws covering Danish citizens extend to all
Available reporting does not detail the
passengers traveling through Copenhagen criteria with which security services
airport such that the Danish Police screen visa applications, but confrmed
Intelligence Service (PET) cannot legally or suspected government or military
obtain routine access to fight manifests. affliation almost certainly raises the
However, if one of PET’s four cooperative
traveler’s profle. Applications can be
airline contacts is on duty, the service can extensive to assist with the vetting process for
unoffcially request a search on a specifc immigration authorities and the intelligence
name, according to August 2007 liaison and security services. For example, Russia’s
reporting. (S//OC/NF)visa application form requires employer name,
address, telephone number, supervisor’s Airport Primary Screening
full name, and applicant’s position for the
current and past two places of employment. In primary inspections, immigration inspectors
The application also requires military dates examine passports and visas, if visas are
of service, rank, occupation, specialized required, for validity and authenticity and to
skills; experience with nuclear, biological, or verify individuals’ identities. They frequently
chemical activities; and all professional, civil, query watch lists or other databases for
and charitable organizations of which the immigration violations, criminal records, or
applicant is or was a member, contributed to, national security concerns and ask basic
or worked with. (S//OC/NF) questions pertinent to admissibility. The entire
process usually lasts no more than a few
Immigration offcials may also receive minutes to enable airports to keep up with the
advance information on arriving passengers fow of incoming travelers. If there is a
watchfrom airlines through an advance passenger list match or inspectors decide that travel
information system (APIS) or passenger documents are suspect or have some reason
name records (PNRs). APIS information, to doubt a passenger’s stated reason for
which enables an advance check against travel, they refer the passenger to secondary
watch lists, includes passenger name, date screening. Offcials at US airports on average
of birth, sex, passport details, and contact
send about one in 30 foreign tourists and Watch-list Hit
business travelers to secondary although Border-control offcials in many countries
particular airports may impose higher use watch lists—national, regional, and
percentages for certain groups. For example, international—to screen travelers. For
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) example, the Schengen Information System
agents in 2007 imposed secondary screening (SIS), an EU-wide database, contains one
on 20 percent of Cubans arriving at Miami million alerts on persons wanted by the police,
International Airport. Available reporting does subject to entry bans, or missing. Most SIS
not indicate secondary selection percentages entries deal with other immigration issues
for foreign airports. (U) such as visa denials or expulsions, and only
2.5 percent are criminal-related. Elsewhere,
With the exception of Israel’s Ben Gurion the watch list focus may be different. For
airport and a few others, immigration example, the overwhelming majority of names
inspectors conducting primary screenings on the Directorate General for Immigration
generally lack the time and tools to conduct (DGI) watch list at Soekarno-Hatta
in-depth examination of travelers’ bona fdes. International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, are
EU norms stipulate that passport checks nationals suspected of corruption or fnancial
take no longer than 20 seconds per traveler. crimes. (S//OC/NF)
Dutch Royal Military Police (KMAR) offcers
at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam are under
Good Preparation Is Key (U)instruction to spend no more than 10 seconds
Travelers can minimize the possibility of sec-evaluating each passport although few
ondary by knowing how to prepare for and offcers achieve this speed, according to July
navigate the primary inspection and by avoiding 2009 liaison reporting. (S//OC/NF)
to the extent possible the various triggers for
secondary. (S//OC/NF)Triggers for Secondary Screening
Referral to secondary screening can occur
Watch lists maintained by security services
for concrete reasons, such as a
watchcan also include names of confrmed or
list match or discovery of contraband,
suspected intelligence offcers, according to
because of random selection, or because
reporting from several clandestine sources
the inspector suspects that something about
and the US Embassy in Dushanbe.
the traveler is not right. According to the
CBP, inconsistencies or conficts identifed • Austria’s Federal Offce for the Protection
in the interview or documentation, including of the Constitution and Counterterrorism
catching the person in a false statement, (BVT) and Singapore’s Internal Security
unreasonable explanation for travel, or Department (ISD) list Russian intelligence
anomalies in ticketing or reservations will offcers.
prompt a referral to secondary screening.
• Colombia’s Administrative Department Travelers from specifc countries arriving at
of Security (DAS) lists Iranian and international airports are more likely to receive
Venezuelan intelligence offcers.heightened scrutiny, and referral to secondary
screening, than other travelers. Behavior,
• Tajikistan’s State Committee for National
dress, and demeanor also factor into an
Security (GKNB) lists intelligence offcers inspector’s decision. However, no traveler is
belonging to unidentifed Western immune from the possibility of secondary—
countries. (S//OC/NF)many foreign airports have an administrative
requirement for a minimum number of random Available reporting does not confrm the
selections. (U) presence of names of suspected or confrmed
US intelligence offcers on foreign watch traveling to Turkey. Possession of three
lists; however, this probably should be passports––Iranian, Israeli, and Italian––
assumed. Hostile and probably even allied prompted the apprehension in Frankfurt in
services seek to identify US and other foreign January 2008 of an Iranian citizen. Inspectors
intelligence offcers. (S//NF) at Baghdad International Airport specifcally
look for appropriate customs and immigration
Discovery of Contraband stamps to ensure travelers are not using
Security and customs offcials have wide multiple passports. (S//OC/NF)
latitude to search passengers and their
checked and carry-on baggage for weapons, Immigration inspectors may look for evidence
drugs, and contraband. Although drugs are of fraud even with e-passports. Media
a common target of customs inspectors, reports indicate that computer researchers
the defnition of contraband is country- have inserted fraudulent digital images into
dependent. For example, travelers at Imam e-passports. Although falsifed e-passports
Khomeini Airport in Tehran, Iran, found with will not have the correct digital signature,
videos or photographs of protests or other inspectors may not detect the fraud if the
opposition activity are directed to a secondary passports are from countries that do not
questioning room where they undergo full participate in the International Civil Aviation
searches of laptop computers and other Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO
electronics. Bahrain International Airport PKD). Only 15 of over 60 e-passport-issuing
security offcials refer to secondary screening countries belong to the PKD program, as of
travelers carrying unusual electronic December 2010. (U)
equipment. (S//OC/NF)
Suspicious Signs
Passport Irregularity
Airport inspectors can also refer to secondary Problems with passports, the main travel
screening individuals who arouse suspicion document worldwide, are a frequent cause of
but for whom there is no substantive cause referral to secondary. Fraudulent passports,
for denying entry. An airport screening possession of multiple passports, and
procedures manual published for internal passports containing data in confict with visas
use in 2004 by International Consultants on may prompt secondary scrutiny. Most users of
Targeted Security (ICTS) International, an fraudulent documents seeking to enter Europe
Israeli-founded company and world leader are illegal migrants from poor countries. For
in profling techniques, lists suspicious signs example, the majority of counterfeit passports
in passenger behavior, documentation, uncovered in Ireland are from Brazil, China,
tickets, or baggage. Although dated, the ICTS and Romania. Offcials also focus on
guidelines probably are typical and remain fraudulent use of genuine passports. Falsifed
valid. (S//NF)travel documents intercepted at Santiago
International Airport in Chile are usually
genuine Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian
Foreign airports use cameras and undercover
passports but with counterfeit EU or US visas.
offcers to identify passengers displaying
Illegal travelers may carry stolen passports
unusually nervous behavior. Physiological
and attempt to pass themselves off as the
signs of nervousness include shaking or
person in the photograph. (S//OC/NF)
trembling hands, rapid breathing for no
apparent reason, cold sweats, pulsating The Turkish National Intelligence Organization
carotid arteries, a fushed face, and avoidance (TNIO) assesses that possession of multiple
of eye contact. passports is indicative of an individual
attempting to obscure their real reason for
ICTS Profling Guidelines (U)
• Unusual nervousness or anxiety by passenger or those accompanying the passenger.
• Secret contact with other passengers lacking apparent ties.
• Appearance of lying or withholding information.
• Lack of familiarity with passport entries (biographic page, previous travel).
• Stamps or visas from a terrorism-sponsoring country.
• Inability to speak the language of the passport-issuing country.
• Unusual itinerary.
• Purchase manner unusual to the place of issue.
• Purchase or itinerary change within 24 hours of the scheduled fight.
• Baggage or contents inconsistent with the passenger’s appearance, profession, or ticket class.
• Contents inconsistent with passenger’s description of contents.
• Amount of baggage unusual for the ticketed itinerary. (S//OC/NF)
Source: ICTS International NV CSA Tasks, Nov 04, Confdential Proprietary
• At Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport in signs of nervousness or other suspicious
Hungary, security offcers use closed- behavior. (S//OC/NF)
circuit television (CCTV) and one-way
Suspicious behavior includes continuously mirrors to monitor passengers for signs of
switching lines or studying security nervousness.
procedures. Offcials at Abidjan International
• The Bahrain National Security Agency Airport in Cote d’Ivoire noticed a male
(BNSA) deploys undercover offcers in passenger frequently switching lines to
the arrivals lounge of Bahrain Airport to avoid processing at a particular booth and
actively look for travelers who appear to referred the traveler to secondary screening.
be nervous. If offcials at Narita Airport in Tokyo, Japan,
notice someone who appears to be studying
• Offcers of the National Security Service the customs inspection process, they assume
(NSS) in Mauritius use video cameras to that someone in that group of passengers
observe arriving passengers as they exit must be attempting to smuggle drugs or other
the aircraft and retrieve their baggage, contraband and intensify their inspection
zooming on individuals’ faces to study efforts. (S//OC/NF)
their expressions.
Country of Origin
• During passenger arrival procedures at Immigration and customs offcials at various
Burgas International Airport in Bulgaria, airports associate specifc countries with
multiple border police offcials, including at illegal immigration, terrorism, or drugs and
least one offcer behind the passengers at are more likely to refer those travelers to
passport control, monitor passengers for secondary screening. (U)
Travel Pattern secondary interviews. Zambian immigration
A travel history that indicates possible offcers suspect that a pattern of short-stint
association with narcotraffcking, Islamic trips between Zambia, Pakistan, and
extremism, or illegal immigration can prompt a South Africa indicates possible drug
referral to secondary. A review of clandestine smuggling. (S//OC/NF)
reporting reveals examples of what various
Ticket and Baggage countries consider to be suspicious. The
Ticket purchase anomalies can result in Chilean Investigative Police (PICH) considers
a referral to secondary. Czech Airlines travel originating in East Asia with multiple
(CSA), the primary screening authority for stops as potentially suspicious. The Gambian
passengers departing Ruzyne Airport in National Intelligence Agency (NIA) considers
Prague focus on reservation details such as frequent travel to Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau
cash payment, ticket purchased at the airport as suspicious. Israel’s security personnel
or on the travel date or the day before, one-focus on frequent travel to Islamic countries.
way travel, and lack of checked baggage. For Venezuela’s Offce of National Identifcation
example, CSA preselected a Nigerian national and Foreign Status (ONIDEX) fags foreign
with one-way ticket and no checked baggage travelers who travel to Venezuela fve or
in July 2009 for secondary screening, more times a month for subsequent
Area of
Airport Travelers’ Countries of Origin
Western Africa; portions of Eastern Europe;
Portela International Airport,
former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Brazil,
Lisbon, Portugal
Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique
Simon Bolivar Airport,
Immigration Cuba
Caracas, Venezuela
Soekarno-Hatta International
Afghanistan and Iran
Airport, Jakarta, Indonesia
Eleftherios Venizelos Airport,
Egypt, Iran, and Iraq
Athens, Greece
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran,
Terrorism Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Sri Lanka
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the
Saudi Arabia (various)
Palestinian territories
Eleftherios Venizelos Airport, Afghanistan, India, the Netherlands, and
Athens, Greece Pakistan
Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan Amsterdam and Bangkok
Seychelles Airport, Victoria,