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Self Regulation and Negotiated Agreements: Complements or Substitutes

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Niveau: Supérieur, Doctorat, Bac+8
Self-Regulation and Negotiated Agreements: Complements or Substitutes? Thomas P. Lyonand John W. Maxwelly January 31, 2011 Abstract The literature on negotiated agreements generally assumes away the possibility of corporate self-regulation. Yet in practice ?rms may have incentives to self-regulate in order to in?uence the outcome of negotia- tions. When the two are studied jointly in a single model, the question arises whether self-regulation and negotiated agreements are complements or substitutes. We present a general model of the two tools, in which the ?rm can self-regulate both before and after negotiations regarding a vol- untary agreement. In such a setting, we ?nd that the two instruments are complements. 1 Introduction One of the most striking changes in environmental policy in recent years has been the substitution of voluntary programs for mandatory government reg- ulation. Negotiated agreements, public voluntary programs, and industry self-regulation all have become more prominent as command-and-control reg- ulation, and even market-based instruments, have attracted less interest.1 A substantial literature has developed exploring the performance of these new vol- untary approaches, with rather mixed results. [Alberini and Segerson (2002); Baranzini and Thalmann (2003); OECD (2005); Morgenstern and Pizer (2007); Lyon and Maxwell (2007)] This literature has shown that voluntary approaches Dow Chair of Sustainable Science, Technology and Commerce, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109.

  • untary approaches

  • administration has

  • ?rm

  • voluntary programs

  • performance track

  • self regulation

  • regarding climate

  • bene?cial when

  • self


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Self-RegulationandNegotiatedAgreements:ComplementsorSubstitutes?ThomasP.LyonandJohnW.MaxwellJanuary31,2011AbstractTheliteratureonnegotiatedagreementsgenerallyassumesawaythepossibilityofcorporateself-regulation.Yetinpracticermsmayhaveincentivestoself-regulateinordertoinfluencetheoutcomeofnegotia-tions.Whenthetwoarestudiedjointlyinasinglemodel,thequestionariseswhetherself-regulationandnegotiatedagreementsarecomplementsorsubstitutes.Wepresentageneralmodelofthetwotools,inwhichthefirmcanself-regulatebothbeforeandafternegotiationsregardingavol-untaryagreement.Insuchasetting,wefindthatthetwoinstrumentsarecomplements.1IntroductionOneofthemoststrikingchangesinenvironmentalpolicyinrecentyearshasbeenthesubstitutionofvoluntaryprogramsformandatorygovernmentreg-ulation.Negotiatedagreements,publicvoluntaryprograms,andindustryself-regulationallhavebecomemoreprominentascommand-and-controlreg-ulation,andevenmarket-basedinstruments,haveattractedlessinterest.1Asubstantialliteraturehasdevelopedexploringtheperformanceofthesenewvol-untaryapproaches,withrathermixedresults.[AlberiniandSegerson(2002);BaranziniandThalmann(2003);OECD(2005);MorgensternandPizer(2007);LyonandMaxwell(2007)]ThisliteraturehasshownthatvoluntaryapproachesDowChairofSustainableScience,TechnologyandCommerce,UniversityofMichiganBusinessSchool,AnnArbor,MI,48109.Email:tplyon@umich.edu.KelleySchoolofBusiness,IndianaUniversity,Bloomington,IN,47405.Email:jw-max@indiana.edu.1Informationdisclosureprograms,bothmandatoryandvoluntary,havealsobecomemorepopularinrecentyears,buttheyarebeyondthescopeofthepresentpaper.1