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Demander la lune : la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne - article ; n°1 ; vol.10, pg 127-144

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Revue européenne de migrations internationales - Année 1994 - Volume 10 - Numéro 1 - Pages 127-144
Pedir la luna : La participación politica de los inmigrantes en la Comunidad Europea
Patrick IRELAND
Según lo han reconocido los responsables de los gobiernos, la integración europea no se alcanzará si no se desarrolla un enfoque coordinado que tienda a la vez a una regulación de la inmigración y del flujo de los refugiados y a la integración de más de ocho millones de trabajadores extranjeros y sus familias que no pertenecen a la CEE (« ciudadanos de paises terceros ») que residen en la Comunidad. El trabajo presentado aquí muestra que la integración Europea ha producido un efecto político de incitación sobre las comunidades de inmigrantes. Estas generan, a nivel europeo, nuevas formas de organización y nuevas lineas de solidaridad. Sin embargo mucho más que los europeos autóctonos, las poblaciones de origen extranjero se han enfrentado a obstáculos cuando tratan de influír al proceso de decisiones políticas de la CEE. La distancia que separa los inmigrantes de la Comunidad y de sus políticas, la estructura institucional de la Comunidad y la tendencia a las negociaciones intergobernamentales, la diversidad de políticas de inmigración nacionales y las acciones específicas de las autoridades de la CEE crean obstaculosa la participación de los inmigrantes. Diferencias júridicas an aparacecido entre los ciudadanos de los países de la CEE y los de los otros países, así como (en numerosos casos) entre la segunda generación de inmigrantes y sus padres. El hecho que empiezen a encontrar un modo de expresión politica de nivel europeo a pesar de todas estas difïcultades es una prueba a la vez de su alto nivel de conciencia politica y de su temor de ver la unificación europea hacerse a costa de sus inmigrantes.
Demander la lune : la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne
Patrick IRELAND
Comme l'ont reconnu les chefs de gouvernement de la communauté européenne, le projet d'intégration européenne ne peut réussir que s'ils mettent en place une politique coordonnée visant à (a) réguler l'immigration et l'afflux des réfugiés et (b) intégrer la population de huit millions et plus de travailleurs étrangers et de leurs familles qui viennent de l'extérieur de la Communauté européenne (ressortissants de pays tiers) et qui résident sur son territoire. L'analyse développée dans le présent article est que l'intégration européenne a eu un effet d'entraînement sur le plan politique parmi les populations immigrées. Celles-ci créent à l'échelle européenne de nouvelles formes d'organisation et de schémas de solidarité. Toutefois, et bien plus encore que les Européens de souche, ces populations d'origine étrangère se heurtent à des obstacles lorsqu'elles s'efforcent de faire valoir leurs positions dans le processus de prises de décision politique communautaire. L'éloignement qui sépare les immigrés de la Communauté et sa politique, les structures institutionnelles de cette dernière et ses tendances en faveur de négociations au niveau intergouvernemental, la pluralité des politiques nationales d'immigration et les mesures spécifiques des autorités communautaires sont autant d'obstacles empêchant la participation immigrée. Des clivages juridiques se sont instaurés entre les citoyens de Communauté et les ressortissants de pays tiers, et dans bien des cas entre les immigrés de seconde génération et leurs parents. Le fait que, dans l'ensemble, ils commencent à trouver un mode d'expression politique au niveau européen malgré les obstacles témoigne à la fois d'une prise de conscience politique élaborée et grandissante de leur part, et de leur crainte de voir l'unification européenne se réaliser à leurs dépens.
Asking for the Moon : the Political Participation of Immigrants in the European Community
Patrick IRELAND
As the EC heads of government have acknowledged, the European integration project cannot succeed unless they develop a coordinated approach toward (a) regulating immigration and the influx of refugees and (b) integrating the over eight million foreign workers and their families from outside the EC (« third-country nationals ») who reside in the Community. I argue here that European integration has produced a political « spillover » effect on immigrant communities. They are generating new, European-level forms of organization and lines of solidarily. However, even more than indigenous Europeans, foreign-origin populations have run into barriers when trying to gain a say in the EC policy-making process. The distance separating immigrants from the Community and its policies, the Community's institutional structure and the trend toward intergovernmental bargaining, the diversity of national immigration policies, and the specific actions of EC authorities have all hampered immigrant participation. A legal wedge has been driven between EC and third-country nationals, and in many cases between second-generation immigrants and their parents. That they are all beginning to find their European political voice in spite of such obstacles attests to both their growing political sophistication and their fear that European unification might take place at their expense.
18 pages
Source : Persée ; Ministère de la jeunesse, de l’éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l’enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation.

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Patrick R. Ireland
Demander la lune : la participation politique des immigrés dans
la communauté européenne
In: Revue européenne de migrations internationales. Vol. 10 N°1. Mobilisations des migrants en Europe – Du
national au transversal. pp. 127-144.
Citer ce document / Cite this document :
Ireland Patrick R. Demander la lune : la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne. In: Revue
européenne de migrations internationales. Vol. 10 N°1. Mobilisations des migrants en Europe – Du national au transversal. pp.
127-144.
doi : 10.3406/remi.1994.1394
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remi_0765-0752_1994_num_10_1_1394Resumen
Pedir la luna : La participación politica de los inmigrantes en la Comunidad Europea
Patrick IRELAND
Según lo han reconocido los responsables de los gobiernos, la integración europea no se alcanzará si
no se desarrolla un enfoque coordinado que tienda a la vez a una regulación de la inmigración y del
flujo de los refugiados y a la integración de más de ocho millones de trabajadores extranjeros y sus
familias que no pertenecen a la CEE (« ciudadanos de paises terceros ») que residen en la Comunidad.
El trabajo presentado aquí muestra que la integración Europea ha producido un efecto político de
incitación sobre las comunidades de inmigrantes. Estas generan, a nivel europeo, nuevas formas de
organización y nuevas lineas de solidaridad. Sin embargo mucho más que los europeos autóctonos, las
poblaciones de origen extranjero se han enfrentado a obstáculos cuando tratan de influír al proceso de
decisiones políticas de la CEE. La distancia que separa los inmigrantes de la Comunidad y de sus
políticas, la estructura institucional de la Comunidad y la tendencia a las negociaciones
intergobernamentales, la diversidad de políticas de inmigración nacionales y las acciones específicas
de las autoridades de la CEE crean obstaculosa la participación de los inmigrantes. Diferencias
júridicas an aparacecido entre los ciudadanos de los países de la CEE y los de los otros países, así
como (en numerosos casos) entre la segunda generación de inmigrantes y sus padres. El hecho que
empiezen a encontrar un modo de expresión politica de nivel europeo a pesar de todas estas
difïcultades es una prueba a la vez de su alto nivel de conciencia politica y de su temor de ver la
unificación europea hacerse a costa de sus inmigrantes.
Résumé
Demander la lune : la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne
Patrick IRELAND
Comme l'ont reconnu les chefs de gouvernement de la communauté européenne, le projet d'intégration
européenne ne peut réussir que s'ils mettent en place une politique coordonnée visant à (a) réguler
l'immigration et l'afflux des réfugiés et (b) intégrer la population de huit millions et plus de travailleurs
étrangers et de leurs familles qui viennent de l'extérieur de la Communauté européenne (ressortissants
de pays tiers) et qui résident sur son territoire. L'analyse développée dans le présent article est que
l'intégration européenne a eu un effet d'entraînement sur le plan politique parmi les populations
immigrées. Celles-ci créent à l'échelle européenne de nouvelles formes d'organisation et de schémas
de solidarité. Toutefois, et bien plus encore que les Européens de souche, ces populations d'origine
étrangère se heurtent à des obstacles lorsqu'elles s'efforcent de faire valoir leurs positions dans le
processus de prises de décision politique communautaire. L'éloignement qui sépare les immigrés de la
Communauté et sa politique, les structures institutionnelles de cette dernière et ses tendances en
faveur de négociations au niveau intergouvernemental, la pluralité des politiques nationales
d'immigration et les mesures spécifiques des autorités communautaires sont autant d'obstacles
empêchant la participation immigrée. Des clivages juridiques se sont instaurés entre les citoyens de
Communauté et les ressortissants de pays tiers, et dans bien des cas entre les immigrés de seconde
génération et leurs parents. Le fait que, dans l'ensemble, ils commencent à trouver un mode
d'expression politique au niveau européen malgré les obstacles témoigne à la fois d'une prise de
conscience élaborée et grandissante de leur part, et de leur crainte de voir l'unification
européenne se réaliser à leurs dépens.
Abstract
Asking for the Moon : the Political Participation of Immigrants in the European Community
Patrick IRELAND
As the EC heads of government have acknowledged, the European integration project cannot succeed
unless they develop a coordinated approach toward (a) regulating immigration and the influx of refugees
and (b) integrating the over eight million foreign workers and their families from outside the EC (« third-
country nationals ») who reside in the Community. I argue here that European integration has produced
a political « spillover » effect on immigrant communities. They are generating new, European-level
forms of organization and lines of solidarily. However, even more than indigenous Europeans, foreign-
origin populations have run into barriers when trying to gain a say in the EC policy-making process. Thedistance separating immigrants from the Community and its policies, the Community's institutional
structure and the trend toward intergovernmental bargaining, the diversity of national immigration
policies, and the specific actions of EC authorities have all hampered immigrant participation. A legal
wedge has been driven between EC and third-country nationals, and in many cases between second-
generation immigrants and their parents. That they are all beginning to find their European political
voice in spite of such obstacles attests to both their growing political sophistication and their fear that
European unification might take place at their expense.127
Revue Européenne
des Migrations Internationales
Volume 10 - N° 1
1994
Asking for the Moon :
the Political Participation of
Immigrants in the European
Community (i)
Patrick R. IRELAND
With the Treaty on European Union on its way to passage
in all twelve member-states, the European Community (EC) is trying to implement
its ambitious plan to achieve economic and political unity. The treaty, drafted by
the European Council at Maastricht in December 1991, reconfirms the Community
's commitment to remove remaining restrictions on the free movement of goods,
services, capital, and persons. As the EC heads of government acknowledged, this
project cannot succeed unless they develop a coordinated approach toward both
regulating immigration and the influx of refugees and integrating the over eight
million foreign workers and their families from outside the EC (« third-country
nationals ») who reside in the Community.
The construction of Europe, therefore, has direct consequences for foreign-
origin populations. Given the high stakes, one might expect the EC to serve as an
active stimulus and focus of immigrant political mobilization. Have immigrants
responded to institutional developments in the Community, fashioning European-
level modes of political participation ? How have the children of the foreign work
ers that Europe recruited after World War II reacted ? Second-generation immig
rants belong to Europe perhaps more than to the « homelands », and their
political responses to European integration can indicate its nature, depth, and
limits.
I argue here that European integration has indeed had a political « spillover »
effect on immigrant communities^). They are generating new, European-level
forms of organization and lines of solidarity. However, even more than indigenous
Europeans, foreign-origin populations have run into barriers when trying to gain a
say in the EC policy-making process. The distance separating immigrants from the 128 Patrick IRELAND
Community and its policies, the Community's institutional structure and the trend
toward intergovernmental bargaining, the diversity of national immigration poli
cies, and the specific actions of EC authorities have all hampered immigrant
participation. A legal wedge has been driven between EC and third-country natio
nals, and between second-generation immigrants and their parents. That they are
beginning to find their European political voice in spite of such obstacles speaks to
both their growing political sophistication and their fear that European unification
might place at their expense.
THE BARRIERS
Foreign-origin communities in the European Community confront a range of
factors that make political mobilization at that level problematic. Civil society
plays a weak role in the development of EC policy in general, and immigrants are
not alone in finding it hard to penetrate the closed political world of the « Euristo-
crats »(3). Lacking most traditional political resources, however, foreign workers
and their families have faced especially knotty problems.
THE DISTANCE FROM BRUSSELS
immigrants' The machinations daily lives than of the from EC, those first of of all, member-state seem even citizens. more removed Many noble from
pronouncements have emitted from Brussels and Strasbourg, but the EC has never
made immigrants' needs and concerns a focus of concerted action. Immigrants
« cannot attack Europe, because it is too far away and too abstract »(4). Their
general awareness of the European Community and its activities has been very
low. The struggle to make a living and to integrate into the host society occurs not
at the European level but in the poor, working-class neighborhoods and decrepit
housing projects of the continent's industrial metropolises. The young, whose
socioprofessional integration has stalled in every EC member-state, feel alienated
in their own communities and are unlikely to seek answers from a « state of courts
and technocrats »(5).
THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The institutional setup of the EC, moreover, has complicated matters for the
Community's policy-makers and migrants. European governments have respon
ded to the foreign presence that their post-war labor policies created in an ad hoc
manner that has exacerbated social tensions. The shortcomings of national immi
gration policies have heightened pressures for the Community to intervene.
It has been slow to do so. The EC has a « multi-tiered » structure : there is a
« pooling of national sovereignties » but no truly federal system »(6). This political
architecture has resulted in bitter fights between EC institutions over the locus of
policy control. The European Parliament (EP), with the least power, has been the
most solicitous toward immigrants. From an early date it advocated harmonized :
Demander la lune la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne 129
immigration and refugee policies and called for the sociopolitical integration of
non-EC workers and their families. The EP has harshly criticized the EC Commiss
ion and Council of Ministers for dragging their feet and allowing anti-foreigner
sentiment to escalate dangerously(7).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg, for its part, has dis
played remarkable activism. EC law generally has direct effect : it becomes part of
the acquis communautaire that domestic courts must enforce. The Court reviews
the legal status of acts undertaken by Community institutions, supervises member-
state compliance with the founding treaties and secondary Community legislation,
and interprets EC law for domestic courts(8). The Court has strived to rise above
and mitigate the inter-institutional squabbling that has so often paralyzed the
EC(9).
In the meantime, to whom should immigrants direct their demands at the
European level ? The justices of the Luxembourg Court are not amenable to
pressure-group lobbying. The institutional turf battles and the weakness of the Parliament have combined to reduce seriously the EC as a locus of
immigrant political interest.
THE TREND TOWARD INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
At the same time, the EC's multi-tiered institutional setting has hindered it
from taking affirmative steps to manage immigration. When they shut their doors
to new inflows in the mid-1970s, the host societies had not eliminated the « push »
factors in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East that produced them. Family reunifica
tion added to legally resident foreign-origin populations, and much of the remai
ning influx simply streamed into clandestine and refugee channels.
Pressures to harmonize member-state policies continued to build. Instead,
only loose policy coordination has ensued, which has further discouraged immig
rants from addressing their political demands to the EC. Cooperation between
member-state governments — outside Community institutional control — has
become the preferred mechanism to reconcile national sovereignty and European
interests.
In 1975 civil servants from the justice and interior ministries of the then nine
member-states came together for the first time as the so-called Trevi Group(10).
They have set up a number of subgroups to develop joint approaches to terrorism,
drugs, threats to public order, crime, and immigration. In their secret regular
conferences they have acted as an intergovernmental coordinating and planning
instance.
By the mid-1980s the EC's project for a single market was exacerbating fears
that the absence of true policy harmonization would allow member-states to
« dump » their immigration-related problems on their neighbors. In the end,
though, national governments issued a declaration subsequent to the drafting to
the Single European Act that affirmed : « Nothing in these provisions shall affect
the right of member-states to take such measures as they consider necessary for the
purpose of controlling immigration from third countries »("). Patrick IRELAND
Those member-states have developed lowest-common-denominator strate
gies. The governments of Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, most
notably, worried that Europe was too leisurely in implementing free movement.
They decided to move ahead on their own and in June 1985 agreed in Schengen,
Luxembourg, to remove all controls at their common frontiers by New Year's Day
1990(12). Spurred by the example of « Schengenland » (now including Italy, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece) an Ad Hoc Immigration Group emerged within the secreta
riat of the Council of Ministers in 1986 to work out (behind closed doors) the
technicalities of removing of internal border controls (13).
In the years since, European Community heads of government — meeting
biannually as the European Council — have taken the lead(14). The 1988 Rhodes
summit spawned the Group of Coordinators to oversee all work in EC bodies on
asylum, immigration, customs, judicial, and security policies. The 1990 Dublin
summit produced a convention on political asylum. The rights and the integration
of third-country nationals, meanwhile, have been downgraded to a very long-term
objective.
governments' The Treaty of Maastricht, too, does more to strengthen national
power than provide the EC with new institutional capacity. The treaty expliveto
citly authorizes closer cooperation between two or more member-states — in other
words, Schengen-style arrangements. In the immigration policy area, as in others,
Maastricht embraces the « subsidiarity » principle : EC legislation is appropriate
only when « legal security and uniformity provided by Community law constitutes
the best instrument to achieve the desired goal »(15).
DIVERSE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Thanks to the intergovernmental approach, immigrants in the Community
still live and work within very different national policy frameworks. EC member-
states have not experienced immigration pressures to the same degree. Their
foreign populations vary in size, regional concentration, and ethnic composition.
In the face of such homogeneity, governments have provided divergent policy
responses.
Immigrants cannot escape domestic political and legal contexts. Non-EC
nationals' rights to choose their employer, occupation, and place of residence
normally expand the longer they live in a host society, yet the rate has been
different in each. Residence permits have varied widely in their duration within the
Community, often changing over time even in a single member-state. Sometimes
they have been linked to work permits (France), and sometimes not (Denmark,
Greece, Ireland). National policies have likewise diverged with respect to political
rights, family reunification, access to public education and state-subsidized
housing, visa requirements, and measures to control illegal immigration and to
combat racial and ethnic discrimination.
For second-generation immigrants the institutions of citizenship in each
member-state have loomed as most critical. Nation-states have held to their dis
tinctive citizenship laws and naturalization procedures. In attributing citizenship at :
Demander la lune la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne
birth, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal emphasize parentage and blood
ties (the principle of jus sanguinis) to varying degrees. Elsewhere birthplace (jus
soli) more or less determines citizenship. Naturalization procedures, too, range
from extremely liberal (in the Netherlands : five years' residence, minimal knowl
edge of Dutch, and no criminal offense) to highly protectionist (in Germany : ten
years' residence and strict requirements regarding language skills, employment
history, and « attitude »). Britain, France, Ireland, and Italy allow dual citizenship,
whereas Germany and Denmark expressly forbid it(16).
Such differences have had a major impact on second-generation political
organizing. Some member-states have witnessed the formation of bonafide social
movements, whereas others have not. In France immigrants'
socioprofessional opportunities have been severely limited. But since they can or
will acquire French citizenship, what was once a mere « social category » (a group
of individuals sharing recognized common traits) is becoming a « social actor » a
group having a collective identity on the basis of which it intervenes in the sociopol
itical realm. By contrast where even youngsters born and raised in a host society
enjoy no special access to citizenship, their political marginalization and passivity
can be nearly complete(17).
THE ACTIONS OF EC OFFICIALS
The EC's institutional structure, in sum, has restricted democratic input and
has given fairly free play to national governments. Furthermore, Community
authorities have themselves compounded the obstacles to European-level immig
rant political mobilization. They have exacerbated discrimination between
rants from within and outside the EC and weakened the efforts of immigrant-
origin associational movements to achieve transnational solidarity.
The Treaty of Rome that laid the foundations for the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1958 provided for the progressive acceptance of complete
labor mobility between signatory states. The Community has made significant
advances toward that ideal. The five million resident migrants from within the EC
command key rights when they move about the Community. They and their
dependents have gained equal treatment in housing and social assistance ; trade-
union rights ; the right to remain in another member-state after suffering perman
ent disability or involuntary unemployment ; and a limited right to retire and
look for employment in another member-state, aggregate social security contribut
ions, and « export » pensions. Upon demand legal EC workers receive a residence
permit, valid for five years and automatically renewable. Member-states can res
trict freedom of movement and establishment for reasons of public safety and
order, national security, and public health ; then again, the European Court of
Justice has defined these limitations very narrowly(18).
Third-country nationals, in contrast, do not enjoy free movement. Member-
state prerogative still governs their entry into the Community ant its labor market.
True, the ECJ has expanded the Community's definition of « worker » and has
handed down decisions that secure non-EC workers the same social, employment,
and fiscal rights as EC nationals(19). But the member-states have continued to Patrick IRELAND
discriminate between EC and non-EC migrants. The Treaty of Maastricht, accor
dingly, advances a European citizenship. It would guarantee EC citizens meeting
certain residency requirements the right to vote and run for office in local and
European elections. In order to promote a « European consciousness », the
Community thereby underscores the difference between EC and third-country
nationals(20).
The same tactic has been evident in the EC Migrants Forum. Southern Euro
pean immigrants argue that EC citizenship has not guaranteed them equal trea
tment in the Community. Refusing to grant Europeans special status, the Commiss
ion nevertheless excluded them from the Forum, established in May 199 1(21). At
the Forum's General Assembly in 1992, MEP Djida Tazdait, a French Green and
Beur, summed up its mission : « I urge the General Assembly to carve itself out a
position of influence, and to lobby hard in order to carry weight in European
politics... The main goal is to be able to represent the 8 to 9 million extra-commun
ity residents to make sure that they do not suffer in full force from the construc
tion of Europe »(22).
Critics have argued that the EC Migrants Forum spends too much of its
500,000 ECU annual subsidy promoting dubious pet projects. The 1 10 immigrant
associations active in the Forum have focused on multicultural educational pro
grams for second-generation immigrants ; but they limit their concern to instruc
tion in the language and culture of the homelands. Another top priority has been a
campaign for the naming of a special European Commissioner to spearhead the
fight against racism. The Community has rejected this proposal before and is
unlikely to accept it any time soon : the Forum is « asking for the moon »(23).
SURMOUNTING THE OBSTACLES
The Forum does represent at least a first move toward opening EC political
access for immigrants. And however difficult it might be to organize interests at a
European level, there have been other attempts to overcome the barriers. Some
efforts have occurred under the auspices of homeland governments, Islamic
groups, trade unions, and sympathetic non-governmental organizations. Foreign
workers and their children have also engaged in autonomous action. Though yet
tentative, these initiatives demonstrate the Community's growing relevance for the
immigrant communities.
HOMELAND-ORIENTED PARTICIPATION AND ISLAM
The immigrants' homeland governments, first, have constructed webs of
consular services and other official organizations in EC host societies. Officials
from Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, and Turkey have formed
organizational networks to serve more as a means of control than representation.
By comparison, Southern European governments have maintained emigrant's
identification with the homelands while tolerating their political and associational
diversity(24). :
Demander la lune la participation politique des immigrés dans la communauté européenne 133
As the immigration issue has acquired a European dimension, so has homel
and-oriented participation. Italians resident abroad have cast ballots in elections
to the European Parliament since 1 979, as have Iberians and Greeks since the
1980s. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have intervened with the EC Commiss
ion and the European Court of Justice on their expatriates behalf.
Non-EC homeland governments have adapted their approach along similar
lines. The bilateral agreements that Western European governments signed with
their labor-exporting conterparts after the war focused on worker recruitment. But
they generally included provisos concerning the host society's responsabilities in
terms of family reunification, housing, and equality of treatment of the workers
and their dependents(25). As these agreements lapsed or fell into disuse, the EEC
stepped into the breach. Empowered by the Treaty of Rome (article 238) to reach
treaties with third countries, the EEC entered into five agreements dealing with
worker mobility : the 1963 Association Agreement with Turkey, and Cooperation
Agreements with the former Yugoslavia (effective in 1983), abrogated in 1991) and
the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco (effective in 1978).
Homeland governments — the Turks, Moroccans, and Algerians in particular —
have protested the EC's failure to grant third-country nationals full freedom of
movement and equal rights and protections(26).
Islam's emergence as a pole of political and cultural mobilization for non-EC
immigrants has upset many member-states. They have dealt with the religion quite
differently, ranging from a national ethnic community model in Britain and the
Netherlands to Germany's complicated federal setup that leaves religious matters
up to the Ldnder{21). As the chapters above by Moustapha Diop and Rémy
Leveau indicate, a number of foreign-directed religious movements have united
segments of Europe's Muslims : the Saudi-based World Islamic League, the
Iranian-backed Islamic Council of Europe, the pietist Sunnite Tabligh movement,
the Turkish Diyanet Içleri Baçkanhgi, the Libyan Committee for the Islamic Vocat
ion, and several militant terrorist organizations. Fear of Islamic fundamentalism
has spurred the EC to improve relations with Islamic immigrants, their organizat
ions, and their homelands. Authorities there have welcomed such contacts in the
interests of security and political stability : « A spirit of solidarity against Islamic
fundamentalist movements has created ties of complicity comparable to those
found in the struggle against left-wing movements in other circumstances »(28).
North African and Turkish authorities have obtained European assistance in
controlling their domestic opponents(29). In return they have assisted in the battle
against terrorism and hostage-taking in the Middle East.
TRADE UNIONS
Homeland-oriented participation has remained significant. Yet as immigrat
ion has become a durable, family affair, the immigrants' political demands have
come to revolve more around the concrete problems of life in Europe. Since the
first generation arrived as worked, they logically first mobilized to influence EC
member-state policies in the factories. There they have had their strongest legal
position and most equal rights of representation. Even at that, they remain under-
represented in most of the national labor movements in the EC.